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ENTRY IN THE ADHD DRUGS MARKET: WELFARE
IMPACT OF GENERICS AND ME-TOO’S*
FARASAT A. S. BOKHARI†
GARY M. FOURNIER‡
Recent decades have seen a growth in treatments for attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) including many branded and generic
drugs. In the early 2000’s, new drug entry dramatically altered market
shares. We estimate a demand system for ADHD drugs and assess the
welfare impact of new drugs. We find that entry induced large welfare
gains by reducing prices of substitute drugs, and by providing alterna-
tive delivery mechanisms for existing molecules. Our results suggest
that the success of follow-on patented drugs may come from unantici-
pated innovations like delivery mechanisms, a factor ignored by pro-
posals to retard new follow-on drug approvals.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT OF 1984 AIMS TO BALANCE THE DUAL OBJECTIVES of
preserving the incentives for undertaking R&D by innovators while at the
same time offering incentives for generic entry. Notably, under Section IV
of the Act the first successful generic entrant to challenge the patent is
granted six months of generic exclusivity (Grabowski and Vernon, [1992,
1996], Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi [2002], Frank and Salkever [1997],
Shulman, DiMasi and Kaitin, [1999]). In recent years, actions by phar-
maceutical firms (as well as approval policies at the Food and Drug
Agency (FDA)) have come under scrutiny for potentially undermining the
intent of the Act. For instance, the introduction of follow-on drugs (the so
called me-too’s) is criticized because they reduce the profits of the inno-
vator and hence the incentives to engage in R&D, without necessarily
offering either price reductions or significant therapeutic benefits to con-
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sumers.1 Similarly, the entry of an authorized generic drug under a license
from the innovator raises concerns since it discourages other generic drug
firms from pursuing entry. In terms of consumer welfare, the latter issue is
further complicated because the licensed generic entry often takes place
well before the patent expiration of the innovator, but perhaps later than
it would have otherwise occurred under the section IV terms, as suggested
by ‘reverse payments’ made by the patent holder to the licensee (Bulow
[2004], Reiffen and Ward [2007], Berndt, Mortimer, Bhattacharjya et al.
[2007], Frank [2007], FTC [2010]).
The introduction of new products expands the range of consumer choice
and increases consumer welfare. The magnitude of welfare effects in turn
depends partly on the level of product differentiation, the steepness of the
individual demand curves and cross-elasticities of demand, as well as the
induced effects on price competition among incumbents and new entrants
(Bresnahan [1997]). These interactions play an especially prominent role in
the pharmaceutical industry where even modest differentiation may lead to
large welfare gains. Consider the introduction of a generic drug. While a
generic does not introduce a new product variety, it may still create large
welfare gains if the market expands to include price sensitive consumers
who formerly were either consuming a drug in a different molecule class, a
different form, or doing without drug therapy. The welfare analysis of
generic entry becomes somewhat more complicated when we recognize the
possibility of price increases for branded drugs in the brand loyal segment
of the market as a response to generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon [1992],
Frank and Salkever [1992], Regan [2008]).
The magnitude of welfare effects of the me-too drugs is also ambiguous.
On one hand, Lu and Comanor [1998] report that in the U.S., me-too drugs
were typically introduced at the same price as the original branded drugs,
and the average effect of adding an extra competitor was a price reduction
of about 2%. Similarly, Lichtenberg and Philipson [2002] report that
‘between-patent’ competition may reduce an innovator’s returns at least as
much as that from ‘within-patent’ competition (the term ‘between-patent’
refers to competition from other drugs in the class and loosely corresponds
to the me-too’s while the latter refers to competition from generics). On the
other hand, DiMasi and Paquette [2004] suggest that me-too drugs may
provide substantial welfare gains by lowering side effects, changing the
delivery mechanism, or targeting a new sub-population and effectively
increasing the market.
In this paper we estimate a demand system for psychostimulant drugs—a
segment fraught with the issues mentioned above—and use our estimates to
1 Me-too drugs are not generics. They are patented ‘follow-on’ drugs, meaning they are are
not the first ones within their class but a patent has been granted presumably because they
contain unique variants of the original drug in the class.
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gauge the potential welfare gains due to the introduction of generics as well
as of me-too’s. We also discuss the likely welfare loss due to the delayed
entry of a generic in this market. The demand for psychostimulant drugs
used to treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has grown
rapidly in the past decade. Between 1990 and 1996, psychostimulant con-
sumption increased 37% nationwide, while the number of patients diag-
nosed with the disorder grew from around 900,000 to approximately 3
million. In 2000, the total sales of ADHD drugs in the U.S. were about $1
billion, and by 2003 had surpassed $2.2 billion (in constant 2000 dollars).
This explosion in the market allowed several drug manufacturers to enter
the ADHD market. By the late 1990’s, there were at least half a dozen
different branded drugs in this market (some were still on-patent) as well as
many generic equivalents of expired patent formulas. The entry by new
drugs has evolved into a large differentiated product system containing
both branded and generic drugs. These new drugs were either new entities
(i.e., new formulas or molecules) or new presentations (i.e., new forms that
extend the release) and were introduced by incumbent drug firms as well as
by new entrants.
Some of the new introductions were almost overnight successes.
Concerta was introduced in 2000 and immediately secured 4.7% of the
market and by 2003 was a ‘blockbuster’ with a market share of 26.1% of all
ADHD drugs. Another blockbuster, Adderall XR, was introduced in 2001
by the incumbent firm Shire which had been marketing Adderall since
1996. Both Adderall and Adderall XR are mixed amphetamine salt based
molecules (MAS) targeted for populations for whom the traditional meth-
ylphenidate molecule (MPH) may not be as effective, and where XR is the
extended release version (MAS-ER) while Adderall is the immediate release
version (MAS-IR). In 2001, the market share of Adderall was 35.8% and
that of Adderall XR was 1.1%. However, by 2003 the share of Adderall was
2.9% while that of Adderall XR was 23.8%. While this may be a case of a
firm’s ‘cannibalizing’ its own product (and shifting market shares), it can be
argued that without such a move, Shire would have lost significant market
share to the generic entry in the MAS-IR segment that took place in 2002.
Additionally, Shire also faced a threat of entry for its Adderall XR product
when a generic manufacturer (Barr laboratories) filed for an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA in February, 2003. Shire
sued for infringement of its key patents on the Adderall XR and eventually
Shire and Barr reached an out of court settlement. Under the terms of the
agreement, Barr agreed not to enter until April, 2009, at which point it
would enter as a licensed generic maker of Adderall XR with a 180-day
exclusivity period.
Following Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994] and Ellison, Cockburn,
Griliches et al. [1997], we use the assumption of weak separability and
multistage budgeting by a representative consumer to divide the market
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into smaller segments in a nested demand system. Our nesting structure is
based on pharmacological differences among various drugs and how they
segment the market (and is described in the next section). The lowest
segments consist of individual drugs within the same molecule and form.
The next level up consists of different forms of the drug in the same
molecule. Level 3 consists of choice across molecules, and finally at the
top-level we estimate a single demand equation which consists of all
psychostimulant drugs used for the treatment of ADHD. Section 3
describes the data and section 4 lays out the empirical specification. Since
prices are endogenously determined, we rely on the common cost shocks
identification strategy used by Hausman [1997] to instrument for the price
of a drug in a given market by its price from another geographic market.
Results and welfare calculations are given in section 5. The last section
concludes.
II. GROWTH AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
II(i). Market Expansion
The demand for drugs to treat ADHD has grown rapidly in the past
decade. It is the most commonly diagnosed behavioral disorder in children
and approximately 3–5% of school-age children have this disorder;
some estimates range as high as 7–12% or between 1.5–6 million children.
About 75–80% of children diagnosed with ADHD are treated with
psychostimulant drugs. Rates of psychostimulant drug use vary as much as
3-fold between states and 10-fold within them (Cantwell [1996], Zito, Safer,
Riddle et al. [1998], Lefever, Dawson and Morrow [1999], Cox, Motheral,
Henderson et al. [2003]).
Sales of several psychostimulant drugs can be traced back to at least the
1950’s. These drugs include some that were specifically approved by the
FDA to treat behavioral disorders, as well as off-label drugs that were
federally approved for other purposes yet were routinely prescribed by
physicians for the treatment of ADHD (ADHD was officially recognized as
a disorder by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1980).
For instance, methylphenidate-HCL (MPH) patented in 1954 by Ciba
Pharmaceutical, was marketed under the trade name of Ritalin for the
treatment of chronic fatigue, depression and narcolepsy as well as to offset
the sedating effects of other medications.2 The FDA approved methylphe-
nidate for the treatment of ‘functional behavior problems’ in 1963, and by
1966, Ritalin was often recommended for children with ‘Minimal Brain
Dysfunction (MBD)’. Sales of methylphenidates grew steadily over the
2 CIBA Pharmaceutical merged with J. R. Geigy, Ltd., to form Ciba-Geigy in 1970.
Ciba-Geigy merged with Sandoz Laboratories in 1996 to form Novartis, which is now the
producer of Ritalin.
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1970’s and 1980’s and got a big boost in the early 1990’s after the publica-
tion of studies showing marked improvement in the school performance of
children suffering from ADHD and on drug therapy (see Evans and
Pelham [1991] and Carlson, Pelham, Milich et al. [1992]). Over the same
period, other molecules had gained acceptance for treating ADHD.
For instance, Obetrol, which consists of four mixed dextro and
levoamphetamine salts, had been unsuccessfully on the market since the
1960’s as an approved obesity drug. In 1994, the rights to the Obetrol
formulation were sold to Rexar, which was subsequently acquired by Shire.
In turn, Shire received approval from the FDA in 1996 to market the mixed
amphetamine salts (MAS) formulation to treat ADHD and sold it under
the brand name Adderall.
Significant growth in psychostimulant drug use began in the early 1990’s
soon after major changes were enacted by policymakers in Washington,
D.C., to include ADHD as a protected disability under the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program and the Individuals With Disabilities Edu-
cation Act (IDEA) (Safer, Zito and Fine [1996], Zito, Safer, dosReis et al.
[2000], Bokhari, Mayes and Scheffler [2005]). The tightening of school
accountability laws over time also contributed to increased diagnosis of
ADHD and demand for psychostimulant drugs (Bokhari and Schneider
[2011]). Concurrently, several state Medicaid programs ‘carved out’ their
mental health benefits to speciality firms during the 1990’s, which also led
to an increase in demand for various psychotropic drugs (Ling, Berndt and
Frank [2008]). This expansion in the market allowed for several drug
manufacturers to enter the ADHD market. Over the same period, promo-
tional activities (physician detailing, journal advertising, free samples,
direct to consumer advertising) for prescription drugs also increased dra-
matically and may have further contributed to an increased demand for
ADHD drugs (total spending on promotions grew at an average annual
rate of 10.6% between 1996 and 2005 (Donohue, Cevasco and Rosenthal
[2007])). In September, 2001, pharmaceutical companies that produced
ADHD drugs broke a 30-year agreement with the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and the FDA not to advertise their Schedule II controlled
substances directly to consumers. As a percentage of sales, the three leading
brands, Adderall XR, Concerta and Strattera (a non-stimulant) spent
6.75%, 4.2% and 16.7% on direct-to-consumer advertising in 2003.
II(ii). Product Differentiation—Role of Molecules and Forms
ADHD is a behavioral disorder marked by excessive inattentiveness and/or
hyperactivity-impulsivity. Children with ADHD are believed to have
abnormal functioning, or dysregulation, of certain brain chemicals known
as neurotransmitters (chemical messengers). ADHD drugs boost levels of
two such neurotransmitters, dopamine and norepinephrine, which help to
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regulate attention and activity. Dopamine is thought to play a role in
memory formation and the onset of addictive behaviors, while norepineph-
rine has been linked with arousal and attentiveness. ADHD drugs increase
the levels of norepinephrine and dopamine by either inhibiting their
reabsorption (reuptake) into cells or by promoting the release of these
chemicals from the brain. For instance, methylphenidate based ADHD
drugs, such as Ritalin, inhibit the reuptake of dopamine into cells, whereas
amphetamine based drugs, such as Adderall, while inhibiting the reuptake
of dopamine, also promote its release into the brain. Depending on the
physiology of a patient, one molecule may be more effective than another.
Additionally, a particular molecule in a given person may induce adverse
reactions. Physicians and patients often have to experiment with different
molecules to help identify which one is most suitable for a given patient (or
rule out those that induce adverse reactions).
Once a molecule is selected, several delivery mechanisms are available
which can significantly affect the choice of a specific drug. The primary
differences are in the absorption rate into the blood stream and the time to
peak effect. Drugs are available in immediate-release (IR) tablets or liquid
form as well as in extended-release (ER) tablets or capsules. Immediate
release formulas, such as Ritalin or Adderall, typically last three to four
hours and are taken two or three times a day. These formulations can be
more tightly controlled in terms of dosage and frequency in order to inhibit
the reuptake and/or promote additional release of neurotransmitters. In the
extended release formulations, part of the drug is released immediately into
the blood stream while the remaining drug in the capsule is released more
slowly and at different rates. These are often further differentiated into
intermediate-acting extended-release tablets, such as Ritalin LA or
Metadate CD that may last six to eight hours, or long-acting extended-
release capsules and tablets such as Concerta that last eight to twelve
hours.3 The extended release forms reduce the peaks and troughs (‘ups and
downs’) over the day and eliminate the need for additional doses during
school hours. Thus, each delivery mechanism comes with its own advan-
tages and disadvantages and further segments the market into subgroups
3 For instance, both Ritalin LA and Metadate CD use a bead-delivery system where the
active molecule (methylphenidate) is packed into two types of beads, rapid-release which
reaches the bloodstream quickly and extended-release beads which dissolve slowly. The
primary difference is that Metadate CD uses 30% of rapid-release beads while Ritalin LA uses
50% of rapid-release beads leading to a difference in the absorption profile across the two
drugs. By contrast, Concerta uses a membrane based technology called Osmotic Release Oral
System (OROS). The tablet is coated with methylphenidate which dissolves immediately into
the blood and exposes a membrane with multiple layers of the drug. As water seeps slowly
through the membrane, it pushes additional drug out to the body and the thickness of the
membrane determines the delivery time.
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(for an accessible reading see Barkley [2006], Conner [2006] and Spencer
[2006]—chapters 5, 17 and 18—in the Barkley [2006] handbook on ADHD
diagnosis and treatment).
Table I lists drugs by groups that that are deemed medically similar by
health care professionals such that those within the same group can be
substituted gram for gram, while those in different subgroups require
dosing adjustments.4 This is not to say that drugs in the same group are
always generic equivalents of each other. For instance, while Ritalin LA
and Metadate CD are in the same group, they embody slightly different
delivery mechanisms (see footnote (3)). The table also provides an approxi-
mate rule that physicians employ when switching a patient’s drug across a
group. The switch from Concerta to Ritalin requires a dosing adjustment
such that if a child was previously consuming 1 mg of Concerta over a
period of time, they would now use only 0.69 mg of Ritalin over the same
period.
4 The grouping in the table is similar to one in Conner [2006]. However, the dosage
equivalence was compiled by Professor Steve Hinshaw (UC Berkeley) and Dr. Peter Levine
(pediatrician with Kaiser Permanente of Northern California). We are indebted to Professor
Hinshaw and Dr. Levine for providing us with the equivalence table.
TABLE I
GROUPS OF BIO-EQUIVALENT DRUGS
Methylphenidates (MPH)
IR ∼ 4hr (1.0) ER-TAB ∼ 8hr (.83) ER-CAP ∼ 8hr (1.25) OROS ∼ 12hr (0.69)
Ritalin Ritalin SR Ritalin LA Concerta
Methylin Methylin SR Metadate CD
Generic Ritalin Metadate ER
Generic Ritalin SR
Mixed Amphetamine Salts (MAS)
IR ∼ 4hr (2.86) ER ∼ 12hr (2.14)
Adderall Adderall XR
Generic Adderall
Dextroamphetamines (DEX)
IR ∼ 4hr (1.75) ER ∼ 8hr (2.14)
Dexedrine Dexedrine SR
Dextrostat Generic Dexedrine SR
Generic Dexedrine
Other molecules (OTH)
(.28) (.44) (.83)
Provigil Cylert Strattera
(Modafinil) (Pemoline) (Atomoxetine)
Generic Pemoline
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The key feature of this table, and one that informs our estimation strat-
egy, is that drugs that can be substituted gram for gram have the same
molecule and form. For instance, within the methylphenidate based drugs,
there are four subgroups by dosage equivalence. Further, these subgroups
differ precisely by the delivery mechanisms mentioned earlier: immediate
release (IR), intermediate-acting extended-release (ER-TAB), long-acting
extended-release (ER-CAP) and Concerta which is in a category by itself.
III. DATA
III(i). Data Source
Data for this study were obtained from the NDCHealth’s proprietary
Source Territory Manager® data files for the years 1999–2003.
NDCHealth’s data set provides at the retail level, total sales (in dollars) and
number of pills dispensed by strength (in milligrams) for several branded
and generic versions of ADHD related drugs at the 5-digit ZIP code level.
The Source Territory Manager’s coverage is about 70% of all retail level
sales (the remaining 30% are pharmacies typically from rural areas). Thus,
for each 5-digit ZIP code in the coverage area and for each year, we know,
for instance, the number of pills dispensed for each strength of Ritalin
(5mg, 10mg and 20mg) as well as the total revenue collected by the retailer
from all parties (insurance plus co-pay) for each strength separately.
Similar information is known for other forms of the drug. Using the
number of pills dispensed times strength, we obtain the total grams for each
drug and form in the local ZIP code area and then aggregate the quantities
and revenues up to county level. Dividing the total revenue by the total
grams gives a measure of the average price in the county year for the
drug-form. Note two features of this measure of the price: (1) it is not a list
price but is closer to the (average) transaction level price, and (2) since it is
based on retail level data (rather than wholesale), it incorporates the final
price of the product paid by all parties (private or public insurance and out
of pocket payments) and not just the co-payment component paid by the
consumer. However, it is not exactly equal to the average transaction level
price because our sales data do not capture rebates. For instance, state
Medicaid programs, which make payments to the pharmacies, receive a
rebate from participating manufacturers under the Medicaid Drug Rebate
Program. These rebates have not been subtracted out of the sales data prior
to dividing by quantities.
III(ii). Sample
For our analysis, we restricted the sample to counties within all Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA’s), i.e., to 852 counties. This choice is dictated
by two factors. First, not all drugs are necessarily consumed in a given
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county-year, especially in rural counties. Thus, while the quantity (or share)
is known to be zero, the price is not known since it is derived as the ratio of
sales to quantity. Including these counties would necessitate imputing the
price. However, the problem is largely avoided if we restrict the sample to
MSA counties. Second, rural counties also have very few physicians, and
since the choice of a drug is in part due to a physician’s experience with a
specific brand, the demand parameters for rural areas may be very different
from those in urban areas. Mixing the two populations may provide an
average effect of price on demand, but may not in fact be representative of
demand for either the rural or urban populations. Thus, we chose to restrict
our analysis to counties in MSA’s and imputed the price of a drug as equal
to the state year average if sales in the county were zero. Finally, we further
restricted the sample to counties with ‘balanced’ observations across years,
i.e., if the drug is on the market, we must be able to observe (positive) sales
for all the years since introduction. This criteria reduced the working
sample further to 778 counties.
For practical reasons, we have also omitted two drugs from our analysis.
The first is Desoxyn which is a methamphetamine molecule. It is legally
produced only by Ovation Pharmaceuticals, however the drug is also avail-
able illegally through its production in clandestine laboratories throughout
the United States, and goes by the street name ‘ice.’ The data from legal
sales was sparse (less than .15% of sales) but it generally sells for more than
$200 per gram. The second drug omitted from our analysis is Focalin which
is a close cousin of the MPH molecule except that it is a single isomer of
MPH. It was introduced in 2002 by Novartis but never attained more than
.5% of the market share during the observation period. We cannot estimate
the price of this drug reliably since it was sold in very few areas. Thus, in
our representative consumer model, these two drugs can be thought of as
belonging to the group, ‘all other goods,’ since both consist of molecules
different from those considered in this study. For the remaining drugs,
price per gram and shares are summarized by year in Table II (all dollar
figures throughout the paper are expressed in constant 2000 dollars and
were deflated using the CPI).
III(iii). Descriptive Statistics
In 1999, Ritalin had 11.7% of the market share while its bio-equivalent
generic version, immediate release methylphenidate (MPH-IR) had 28.9%
of the market share (produced by 15 firms in 2003). New drugs entered the
market in 2000 and by 2003, both Ritalin and its generic version had lost
significant market share and were down to 0.9% and 2.6% respectively.
Over the same period, the average price of Ritalin stayed fairly constant
(except for a spike in 2003) while the price of the generics steadily
declined.
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Concerta entered the market in 2000 and Adderall XR entered in 2001.
While both started with modest shares in the year of their introduction, by
2003 these two drugs had achieved nearly 50% of the entire ADHD drug
market (26.1% and 23.4% respectively), and sold for $73.94 and $125.02 per
gram. Concerta, produced by Ortho-McNeil, introduced its product in a
new niche market. Ortho-McNeil entered into an agreement with ALZA,
the developers of Concerta, starting in 2000. Concerta itself consists of a
time released version of the methylphenidate HCL molecule. However,
ALZA developed Concerta by applying Osmotic Release Oral System
technology (OROS) for its delivery mechanism. While OROS is also an ER
formulation, it is slowly released throughout the day at an increasing rate.
Thus, while other extended release formulations of the MPH molecule
already existed in the market (eg., Ritalin SR and its generic versions), the
OROS technology used by Concerta was the first and only drug to embody
a truly new delivery mechanism in any of the ADHD class of drugs.
Similarly, until the introduction of Adderall XR, no drug was available in
extended release form for the mixed amphetamine salt (MAS) and when
Shire introduced this drug, it too created a new niche market. Shire cur-
rently holds a patent on the XR version which will expire in 2018.
Another important drug that entered the market is Strattera, a non-
stimulant molecule (atomoxetine), introduced in December, 2002, by Eli
Lilly. It attained a significant market share in 2003 (about 15%), perhaps
because it is the only non-stimulant ADHD drug on the market. Unfortu-
nately, our data series ends in 2003 and hence we will not be able to estimate
the individual demand parameters for this drug (in our demand analysis we
lump it into a group called ‘other ADHD drugs’ and only estimate the joint
effects of this broader category).
The generic version of MAS-IR (i.e., generic Adderall) entered in 2002
and by 2003 had a 7.6% market share (distributed over three firms). Note
also that Adderall, the branded drug, enjoyed significant market share up
until the introduction of the generic version in 2002: 21.6% in 1999, 35.8%
in 2001 and then declined to 11.4% in 2002 when the generic entry took
place.
Three other drugs of interest that entered over the study period are
Methylin ER, Metadate CD and Ritalin LA. All three are extended release
forms of methylphenidate HCL. Methylin ER, introduced in 2000 at
$53.76 by Mallinckrodt is about $7 above the average price of other gener-
ics and about $7 below the price of Ritalin SR or Metadate ER.5 The
market share of Methylin ER was .4% while that of Metadate ER and
5 Methylin ER is a generic extended release MPH version of Ritalin SR but is sold under a
trade name since the immediate release version Methylin (also by Mallinckrodt) was already
sold as a branded drug—an NDA application was filed for Methylin with the FDA but an
ANDA application was filed for Methylin ER. A similar issue applies to Metadate ER, also
a generic drug (with an ANDA application) but sold under the trade name of Metadate ER.
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Ritalin SR was .7% and 3.2% respectively. In the following year Celltech,
which was already marketing Metadate ER, launched a new time released
capsule version, Metadate CD.6 This resulted in a total market share of
1.3% (= .6+.7) for Celltech via its two forms of Metadate while the share of
Novartis’s Ritalin SR declined to 1.2%. In the year following that, Novartis
launched it own version of a time released capsule, Ritalin LA.7 The intro-
ductory price of $79 per gram for Ritalin LA was $20 higher than the
pharmacologically closest substitute, Metadate CD. The market share of
Novartis stayed at 1.2% (split as .6% and .6% across LA and SR) while the
market share of Celltech climbed up to 3% (2.5% for CD and .5% for ER).
In 2003, Celltech increased the price of Metadate CD by almost $19 to $78
(which is just $1.4 below that of Ritalin LA in 2003) while its market share
declined by .1% down to 2.4%. Ritalin LA gained a significant market share
over the previous year from .6% to 2.4%.
Generally, Celltech kept the price of its products Metadate ER and CD
slightly below that of the relatively more well known brands Ritalin SR and
LA respectively (with some exceptions) and by 2003 had attained a market
share of 2.4% which is at par with those of Ritalin SR/LA. On the other
hand, Mallinckrodt’s Methylin ER was typically priced slightly above that
of the generics and attained a .6% market share by 2003, compared to the
share of .8% of MPH-ER distributed among 12 generic makers. These are
far more modest shares compared to the success of the blockbusters dis-
cussed earlier, but still large by industry standards. Further, while such
descriptive analysis cannot account for (or hold constant) other simultane-
ous changes in the market, it appears that Metadate ER/CD are closer
substitutes for Ritlan LA/SR while Methylin ER may be a closer substitute
for the generic MPH-ER.
IV. MULTISTAGE BUDGETING AND CONDITIONAL DEMAND FUNCTIONS
A fundamental problem in estimating a system of demand equations for a
set of differentiated products is the problem of dimensionality. For a
system with I products, the demand system q = D(p, z) involves estimation
of I2 parameters, where p is the vector of all prices and z is the vector of
exogenous variables that enter the demand equations. Even if symmetry of
the Slutsky matrix, homogeneity and other restrictions are imposed, the
number of parameters is still large and increases in the square of the
6 Unlike the earlier 8-hour release tablets, Metadate CD is a capsule with biphasic release,
meaning there is an initial rapid release of methylphenidate, followed by a continuous-release
phase (by contrast, for instance, the Metadate ER tablet dissolves slowly over the eight hours
as it passes through the gastrointestinal tract).
7 The primary difference is that Metadate CD releases 30% of the drug initially and the
remaining 70% over an extended period of time while Ritalin LA has an initial rapid release
of 50%.
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number of products. Depending on the research question at hand, the
empirical literature has dealt with the dimensionality issue in a variety of
different methods (for a review of these methods, see Nevo [2000]). Fol-
lowing Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994] and Ellison, Cockburn,
Criliches, et al. [1997], we use the notion of weak separability of preferences
and multistage budgeting to estimate a series of flexible conditional
demand functions. Using parameters of conditional demand systems, we
then back out the unconditional elasticities.
For various stages of the multi-budgeting process, we estimate the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and
Muellbauer [1980a,b] which has several desirable properties. First, since the
AIDS equations are based on a utility function of the generalized Gorman
polar form (for a representative consumer), they satisfy the conditions for
multistage budgeting (at least for the exact two-stage budgeting process).
Second, the AIDS model aggregates well over consumers and provides an
easy way of imposing theoretical restrictions, e.g., adding-up, homogeneity
and symmetry (in the estimation procedure, we impose all three restric-
tions). Third, and most importantly, from an empirical standpoint, the
AIDS specification provides a flexible substitution pattern between drugs
within the same segment. The demand elasticities for individual drugs in a
segment are not constant but functions of prices, and any pair of drugs in
the system can be complements or substitutes. The resulting Engel curves
are nonlinear, a desirable feature often noted in empirical studies. Finally,
while the representative consumer metaphor is retained, the model can
accommodate demographic effects, location, and time trends.
In the discrete choice literature, it is well known that imposing an arbi-
trary grouping and nesting structure for differentiated products can lead to
unexpected results. Further, the results are not necessarily invariant to
alternative grouping schemes. In the absence of a universal grouping rule,
segmentation should be based on the unique features of the industry under
study. We do so here on the basis of the pharmacological properties of
these drugs discussed earlier.
IV(i). Nesting and Specifications
Let there be M molecules indexed by m ∈{1,2,. . .,M}. For each molecule m
there are f forms given by fm ∈{1,2,. . .,Fm} and for each molecule m and
form f there are i drugs given by i If fm m∈{ , , , }1 2 … . For the ADHD drugs,
there are four main molecules (M = 4). These are methylphenidates (MPH
is m = 1), mixed amphetamine salts (MAS is m = 2), dextroamphetamines
(DEX is m = 3) and all other molecules (OTH is m = 4). For the
methylphenidates (m = 1), there are four forms: Immediate Release (IR),
Extended Release Tabs (ER-TAB), Extended Release Caps (ER-CAP) and
Osmotic Release Oral System (OROS). Note that in the ER-CAP segment,
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there are only two drugs, Metadate CD and Ritalin LA. The latter was
introduced in 2002 and hence the segment can only be estimated using a
maximum of two years of data. To overcome this data limitation, we
pre-merged Ritalin LA with Ritalin SR to create a new drug ‘Ritalin
SR/LA’ and Metadate CD with Metadate ER to create a new drug
‘Metadate ER/CD.’ The share of Ritalin SR/LA within MPH-ER is simply
the ratio of the sum of revenue of SR and LA to the total segment revenue
(and similarly for Metadate CD/ER) and hence the MPH segment now
consists of only three forms and thus f1 = {1,2,3}.
For the mixed amphetamine salts as well as for dextroamphetamines
there are two forms each, Immediate Release and Extended Release (thus,
f2 = {1,2} and f3 = {1,2}). The last group, (other molecules (m = 4)) consists
of drugs with three separate molecules, modafinil, pemoline and
atomoxetine. Only pemoline is available as both a branded (Cylert) and
generic drug, while the other two are sold only as branded drugs in the U.S.
(Modafinil and Strattera, respectively). We kept these three molecules in
one category because they are very different from all other drugs consid-
ered so far. Strattera is a non-stimulant ADHD drug while pemoline and
modafinil are stimulants, but because of their severe sides effects, none is
considered a first line drug for ADHD and are often used for treating
narcolepsy.8 Further, with the exception of pemoline, which is available as
tablet and chewable tablet, these drugs are not available in alternative
delivery mechanisms (the relative share of chewable pemoline tables in 2003
was only .01%). Hence, for this segment, there is only one form (i.e.,
f4 = {1}). The specific drugs within each molecule and form are summarized
in Figure 1.
Using multistage budgeting we estimate demand parameters for each of
the segments starting with the segments at the bottom level of the tree. The
set of equations estimated are
(1a) Level Bottom1
1
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lnPi i i
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m
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8 For instance, Cylert (pemoline) specifically mentions on the label that it should not be
considered as a first line therapy for ADHD, and comes with the requirement that the
prescribing physician obtain written consent from the patient prior to prescribing this drug.
Similarly, while Modafinil is approved by the FDA for narcolepsy and a few other uses, it is
not FDA-approved for ADHD. However, some physicians do prescribe it for ADHD. Thus
due to the unique nature of each of these drugs, we kept them in a separate segment.
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where the equations at different levels are linked by the Stone price indexes
(see Deaton and Muell-bauer [1980b]) given by
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The bottom level segment consists of drugs in the same molecule and form.
Thus, the share of the ith drug in molecule-form fm is given by si
P Q
Rfm
i fm i fm
fm
≡
where lnPj fm is the log price of the jth drug in form f within molecule m
and there is a total of I fm drugs in this molecule-form segment (and hence
the number of share equations per segment is I fm ). The terms Rfm and
Pfm are the total revenue and ‘price’ of the f − m segment, where
R P Q P Qf j
I
j j f fm
fm
fm fm m m
≡ ∑ ≡
=1 and the latter is constructed as the share-
weighted sum of the (log) prices, i.e., the Stone-index given by equation (2).
Similarly, Xifm and ϕi fm represent other exogenous variables and the
error terms that affect shares in the segment. Note that there are two
other implicit subscripts a and t that represent area and time. Thus, more
Figure 1
Taxonomy of ADHD drugs by Molecule, Form and Brand Names
Note: Generics refer to several manufacturers for each molecule and form given in the
column. There are no generic versions of Concerta and Adderall XR during the study period.
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accurately, si fm should be written as siat fm to mean the share of drug i in area
a at time t within the molecule-form f-m. Similarly, the error term for
observation from area a and period t is ϕiat fm. However for ease of expo-
sition, we suppress these additional subscripts for now and discuss the
stochastic specification of the equations and additional exogenous vari-
ables in a later section.
At the next level up (level 2), u fm is share of the fth form in molecule m.
The structure and meaning of variables in the level 2 equations is similar to
the bottom level share equations. The variable lnPhm is the price of the form
h in molecule m and is precisely the same term as the price index used in the
bottom level equation. Further, Pm is the ‘price’ of the molecule, con-
structed as the share-weighted Stone index of the price index of the forms
within a molecule, and is given by the middle expression in equation (2).
Level 3 consists of quantity equations in Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., ln(Qm) is
the log-quantity of molecule m and is a function of log prices of the
molecules ln(Pn) which are the same variables as Pm in equation (1b).
Finally, at the top level (level 4) estimation involves a single equation in log
form where total quantity Q is a function of total disposable income (Y) in
the local area and lnP is the Stone index of the price over all M ADHD
molecules constructed as the share-weighted average of the price indexes of
the molecules (see last expression in equation 2 where vm is the share of each
molecule).
IV(ii). Identification
It is widely recognized that individual drug prices in a demand system
are likely to be endogenous, requiring appropriate instrumental variable
methods. One common approach to finding a set of valid instruments is to
use the price of the product from another market based on the assumption
that prices in different cities are correlated via common marginal cost
shocks (see Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994], Hausman [1997],
Hausman and Leonard [2002], Nevo [2000, 2001]). The validity of these
instruments hinges upon the assumption that there are no common demand
side shocks across cities (see Bresnahan [1997]). For example, demand side
errors could be correlated across cities due to regional or national level
advertising campaigns, rendering the instruments invalid.
We use the same basic approach here for identification. We already have
time trends and area dummies included in the specification. To reduce the
possibility of common regional demand side shocks, we choose counties
from far away regions to construct the instruments. Thus, for county c
located in South census region, we draw 20 random counties from the other
three remaining U.S. census regions and use the average price of the drug
observed in the 20 counties as an instrument for the price of the drug in
county c (we experimented with using 1,5,10 or 20 counties and the results
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were fairly similar). While using the average price from far away counties
reduces the possibility of common demand side shocks due to regional
effects, common demand side shock at national level (promotion by a
manufacture in all media markets or a national ADHD awareness cam-
paign) remains a possibility.
IV(iii). Exogenous Variables
States differ in laws regarding the monitoring of psychostimulant drug
consumption. For instance, some states require pharmacies to record and
report to a local monitoring agency (such as the state DOJ) each script
filled out for a psychostimulant drug along with identifying information
about the prescribing physician and some demographic information
about the patient. Such laws can potentially affect retail level price (due
to monitoring cost), and the presence of reporting laws in a state may
correlate with the demand/share of individual drugs since the physician
may be concerned about being flagged as prescribing controlled sub-
stances ‘too much.’ States also differ substantially in school accountabil-
ity laws and there is some evidence that accountability laws are correlated
with the diagnosis of ADHD and the consumption of psychostimulants
(Bokhari and Schneider [2011]). Similarly a major driver of ADHD drugs
is access to Medicaid, which varies by state and year. Many states (at
varying rates) also carved-out their mental health benefits (including
ADHD) to specialty carve-out firms and Ling, Berndt and Frank [2008]
show that this affected demand for various psychotropic drugs. For these
and other similar concerns we include state level variables (state Medicaid
population and Medicaid drug expenditures which vary by year) as well
as state level dummies in all regressions. As additional controls we also
include the log of number of physicians and the log of children in a
county in all specifications. Since either ‘taste’ (or general acceptance) for
a specific drug or a type of drug may be changing over time, we also
include up to a cubic polynomial in time in each segment. If the segment
was estimated for less than four years, or if the cubic term was not sig-
nificant, we would only include up to a quadratic term so as to avoid
problems of multi-collinearity. County level variables, such as employ-
ment rates, per capita income, and other demographic variables by race,
etc., were also added in alternative specifications and are reported in the
robustness section.
Finally, we also include in all level 3 Cobb-Douglas equations the pro-
portion of 12-hour drugs in the MPH and MAS segments. These variables
are included because the Cobb-Douglas equations are quantity equations
for four aggregate molecules whose characteristics are changing over time
at different rates. If consumers derive utility from a product providing
12-hour coverage, then these characteristics would also affect demand and
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relative choice among molecules independent of the price effects. For
instance, the combined share of all MPH drugs declined from 50% in 2000
to 37.6% in 2003 while the share of all MAS drugs increased from 31% to
34%. Over the same period the average price of MPH molecule increased
from roughly $47.9 to $76.3 while the average price of MAS increased from
$19.8 to $43 (adjusted for dosage differences). Put another way, in 2000, the
share of MPH was 1.61 times that of MAS when it was 2.4 times more
expensive, but in 2003, its share was 1.08 times that of MAS even though
now it was only 1.78 times more expensive. One possible explanation for
the change in shares of molecules relative to the change in average prices is
the proportion of the 12-hour drugs within each molecule: in 2000, the
share of the 12-hour drugs within MPH was 9.3% and the share of the
12-hour drugs within MAS was 0% but by 2003, the share of 12-hour drugs
within the two molecules was 69.4% and 69.3% respectively (Concerta was
introduced in 2000 and Adderall XR was introduced in 2001, the only
12-hour drugs in the two molecules respectively). Thus, we control for the
changing characteristics of these molecules by including the proportion of
12-hour drugs within each of these molecules.
IV(iv). Other Estimation Issues
When a patient switches from one drug to another, the conversion is not
always gram for gram. Thus we converted quantities and prices from grams
to defined monthly dosage using the medication equivalence given in
Table 1. The conversion algebra, along with other estimation issues are
described in Appendix A and include: (a) the use of year specific area-
averaged shares in the construction of price indexes in equation 2, (b) the
system estimation for each segment separately, (c) homogeneity and sym-
metry restrictions, and (d) the use of bootstrap methods to obtain standard
errors.
V. RESULTS
V(i). Quantity Equations—Top and Middle (Levels 4 and 3)
We begin with the results of the top and molecule level equations, reported
in Table III. The table shows selected coefficients from the OLS and IV
estimation (the remaining coefficients are given in Appendix B). The OLS
estimate of price elasticity in the top equation is −2.2 and the IV estimate is
−1.2 and both are statistically significant at the 5% level. If simultaneity
were the only source of endogeneity in the equation, one would expect the
OLS estimate to be smaller in magnitude than the IV estimate. However,
the top level equation is for all ADHD drugs combined, and several other
variables that may affect demand (e.g., social capital, churches per capita,
school accountability laws, etc.) are excluded from the equation and are in
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the error term. The direction of OLS bias depends on whether cov(ui, wi) is
positive or negative (where ui and wi represent the error term and the
exclude variables from the equation). In particular, if cov(ui, wi) < 0 then
under OLS, E[ ]2 2βˆ β< where β2 represents the coefficient on price. This
could happen for instance, if the strength of school accountability laws is
positively correlated with demand for ADHD drugs but negatively corre-
lated with the price.
Estimates of level 3 quantity equations are also shown in the same table.
The expenditure elasticities for all four molecules range from .93 to 1.08
under OLS and IV. For the MPH and MAS molecules, they are also
statistically different from one, i.e., demand is not homothetic for these two
molecules. However, a further joint test of all four expenditure elasticities
being one is rejected (joint homotheticity tests for each segment in the IV
estimations are given in Appendix B). There are considerable differences in
the price elasticities of OLS versus IV, where the IV estimates of the
conditional demand functions are typically larger in magnitude than the
OLS estimates. We restrict further discussion to the IV estimates. The
off-diagonals of Γmn provide the Marshallian cross elasticities (the number
in row m column n is the elasticity of drug m with respect to a price change
in drug n). We expect off-diagonals to be positive, or at least not significant
when negative, since the molecules would be either gross substitutes or
possibly not related in cross-price effects if the molecules cannot be
exchanged therapeutically. This turns out to be true among the three main
molecules MPH, MAS and DEX—drugs that generally cannot be mixed—
but some complementarity is indicated with drugs in the ‘OTH’ category.
This result could be either due to inappropriate aggregation of three very
different molecules (pemoline, modafinil and atomoxetine) into a catch all
group ‘OTH’—a modeling choice made necessary due to data
limitations—or indicative of the simultaneous use of main ADHD drugs
and other drugs. The pharmacological literature on ADHD suggests that
4–5% of patients (and 8–10% among some age groups) have their drug
treatment ‘augmented’ with an additional ADHD drug where the augmen-
tation could be either with a drug in the same or another class of drugs and
would explain the complementarity with the ‘OTH’ group (Perwien, Hall,
Swensen, et al. [2004], Christensen, Sasan, Hodgkins, et al. [2010],
Hodgkins, Sasan, Christensen, et al. [2011]). Nonetheless, the fourth equa-
tion is not estimated very precisely and we discuss it further in the robust-
ness and sensitivity section.
V(ii). Share Equations—Forms within Molecules (Level 2)
Next we discuss the results from the middle level share equations for forms
within each of the first three molecules (not including the fourth molecule
since drugs in OTH are conglomerated into one drug). Since the middle and
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bottom level share equations are in AIDS form and involve prices as well as
the price index across forms, interpreting the estimated coefficients is more
complex. Thus, rather than discuss the regression coefficients, we provide
and discuss the estimated elasticities, computed at average shares, in
Table IV. Also, we restrict our discussion to results based only on 3SLS
estimates (henceforth referred to as IV estimates). The conditional elastici-
ties (conditional on Rm) of forms within a molecule with respect to the
‘price’ of the form is derived in Appendix A and is given by
(3)
∂
∂ = − + ′ = − ′ = ′ =′ ′′ ′ ′
lnQ
lnP u
b u g m m f f m mf
f f
f f fh
m
m m
m m m
1
1 1{( ). [ ]} [ , ].
Within the MPH molecule, the own price elasticities of all three forms are
elastic and that of Concerta is −2.92. Concerta appears to be a strong
substitute for the other two forms (all estimates are statistically significant).
However, the immediate release and extended release forms are both gross
and net (Hicks-Allen) complements of each other. This result suggests that
children are often simultaneously using ER and IR: the extended release
version is taken in the morning before going to school (lasting about 8
hours) and a short-acting immediate release version is taken after school
(which lasts about 4 hours) to carry them over to the evening. However,
such a mixture is not needed with the OROS/Concerta (which lasts 12
hours), and hence it acts as a substitute for the other two forms. Next,
within the MAS molecule, both the ER (i.e., Adderall XR which lasts about
12 hours) and IR versions (4-hour) are price elastic and net/Hicksian sub-
TABLE IV
CONDITIONAL ELASTICITIES—MIDDLE LEVEL (FORM WITHIN MOLECULE)
Marshallian Hicks-Allen Expenditure Average
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Share
MPH: Molecule 1. Share among ADHD drugs is .452
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
(A) MPH-IR −1.97a −0.49a 1.54a −4.97a −1.81a 4.11a 0.93a† 0.33
(B) MPH-ER −0.94a −2.34a 2.28a −1.81a −11.94a 5.71a 1.00a 0.18
(C) MPH-OROS 1.02a 0.84a −2.92a 4.11a 5.71a −4.97a 1.05a† 0.48
MAS: Molecule 2. Share among ADHD drugs is .356
(D) (E) (D) (E)
(D) MAS-IR −1.25a 0.30 −1.15a 1.68a 0.95a† 0.59
(E) MAS-ER 0.36 −1.43a 1.68a −2.45a 1.07a† 0.41
DEX: Molecule 3. Share among ADHD drugs is .056
(F) (G) (F) (G)
(F) DEX-IR −0.93a 0.02 −2.03a 0.94a 0.91a† 0.32
(G) DEX-ER −0.03 −1.01a 0.94a −0.44a 1.04a† 0.68
Note: Coefficients reported here are bootstrap means. Superscripts a,b imply that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at 5 or 10% respectively and a dagger (†) implies that the expenditure elasticity is
significantly different from one at the 5% level (inferences are based on empirical CDF’s). Molecule 4 is the all
other ADHD drugs group and we do not distinguish between forms. Hence, no middle level share equations
exist for molecule 4. MPH-OROS is Concerta and MAS-ER is Adderall XR.
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stitutes. Unlike MPH-ER and MPH-IR, Adderall XR is not taken in
combination with the immediate release version and hence MAS-ER and
MAS-IR are net substitutes rather than complements. Nonetheless, the
gross substitution pattern is not as large in magnitude nor statistically
significant. This is perhaps because the 12-hour medication cannot be easily
substituted with three dosages of a 4-hour medication since one of the
dosages would need to be taken midday and may be difficult in some school
settings.
In the DEX class each of the forms exhibits unit elasticity. No firm
conclusion can be drawn about the substitution patterns across forms. The
DEX group consists of three drugs in the IR form (4-hour) and two drugs
in the ER form (8-hour). These forms could be substitutes (a 4-hour medi-
cation taken twice a day instead of a single 8-hour dose), complements (one
8-hour medication followed by one 4-hour medication), or not related. Our
data cannot differentiate between these patterns.
V(iii). Share Equations—Drugs within Molecule-Forms (Level 1)
Finally, we provide the elasticities of individual drugs within their respec-
tive molecule-forms in Table V. Starting with the MPH-IR segment, the
own price elasticities of Ritalin and generics are either in the elastic region
or not statistically different from one, but that of Methylin is inelastic.
Further, Methylin and generics are substitutes for Ritalin, both gross and
net, but they appear to be gross complements of each other. A priori, we
expect all three drugs to be substitutes—since they consist of the same
molecules and are in the same forms. However, the complementarity is not
statistically significant when the income effect is held constant as indicated
by the Hicksian elasticities.
In the next segment (MPH-ER), there are four drugs and each has an
elastic demand. While the three branded drugs are gross substitutes for
each other, once again Methylin ER and the generics appear to be com-
plements (but not statistically significant).
As noted earlier, the price of Methylin ER was typically mid-way
between the price of the generics and Ritalin SR and initially the price of
Metadate CD was lower than that of Ritalin LA. Further, the price of
Methylin ER was always much lower than Ritalin SR and only a few
dollars more than that of the generics. Since Metadate ER/CD and
Methylin ER are ‘brands’ they offer some (perceived) quality enhancement
over the generics, but since they are priced between the price of Ritalin
SR/LA and the generics, they offer some advantage compared to Ritalin
SR/LA. The substitution patterns reveal that by entering as low-priced
brands, they were able to siphon off demand from Ritalin SR/LA as well as
from the generics: a price increase in Ritalin SR/LA leads to consumers’
switching mostly to Methylin ER rather than to generics and similarly, a
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price increase in generics leads to consumers switching to Metadate ER/CD
(see columns (4) and (7)).
In the next three bottom level segments (MAS-IR, DEX-IR and DEX-
ER), own demand elasticities for all medications are elastic but not signifi-
cant for DEX-ER. The substitution patterns suggest that these drugs are
gross and net substitutes for other drugs within their own molecule-forms
or possibly not related when not significant. However, it should be noted
that the segments MAS-IR and DEX-ER are both estimated with only two
years of data (see Table II) and the relative lack of significance on cross
elasticities between, say Adderall and generic Adderall, may reflect a lack of
statistical power rather than that these drugs are not gross substitutes for
each other. In fact, with the exception of Methylin and generic MPH-IR, all
drugs are either substitutes or not related to other drugs in their own
molecule and form as expected but could be complements with drugs
outside the segment.
V(iv). Restrictions Tests
Within each level 1 and level 2 segment, we imposed and tested the homo-
geneity and symmetry restrictions (jointly via the Wald statistic). The null
of valid restrictions was rejected in two segments (MPH-IR and MAS) at
the 1% level and four segments at the 5% level (the results of the test are
given in Appendix B). Because these restrictions are implied by theory and
without them it does not make sense to proceed with any welfare calcula-
tions (since then estimated parameters do not necessarily correspond to any
utility functions) we continued to impose homogeneity and symmetry in all
level 1 and level 2 equations.
V(v). Unconditional Elasticities
While the multi-budgeting process allows estimation of the conditional
demand functions, the cross-price effects are limited to within the molecule-
form segment. Unconditional effects are more general and include the
induced demand effects that work through the budget (expenditure) shares
among all drugs, inside and outside the f − m segment. Thus, a drug that
introduces an important new variety may have a widespread consumption
impact across all segments; its introduction may induce a substantial
demand response in patients (and their providers) who earlier had been
using scripts chosen from any one of the ADHD drugs. In the absence of
the full unconditional demand system, it is still possible to assess the
broader effects of one drug onto another (at least locally) by estimating the
unconditional elasticities from parameters of the conditional demand
systems. The unconditional elasticity (derivation given in the appendix) is
computed from the parameters of the conditional demand functions as
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The unconditional elasticity estimates from our IV estimates for selected
drugs, those in the MPH and MAS segments are shown in Table VI (the
full 17 by 17 unconditional elasticity matrices under IV and SUR estima-
tions are in the appendix). The estimates in this matrix are generally con-
sistent with earlier results, particularly where they were significant. For
instance, unconditionally, drugs 1 and 3 are gross substitutes to each other
whereas Methylin and generic MPH-IR are gross complements, drugs 4−7
have the same sign patterns as before (at least where significant), drugs 1−3
are complements to drugs 4−7 and drugs 1−7 are substitutes for drug 8
(consistent with MPH-IR and MPH-ER being complements and both
being substitutes for OROS). Similarly, in terms of relative magnitudes of
cross-elasticities, while drugs 9 and 10 are substitutes for each other
(4-hour MAS drugs), neither is a strong substitute for drug 11 (12-hour
MAS drug). The substitution patterns outside the molecule are also con-
sistent with the overall substitution patterns across molecules observed
earlier in Table III.
Since the Marshallian elasticities are not symmetric, it is useful to
discuss the unconditional matrix explicitly in terms of a price change in
drug i on the demand for drug j and vice versa. Consider first the effect of
price changes of the new entrants on the demand for other drugs. A price
increase in Metadate ER/CD and Methylin ER (columns 5 and 6 respec-
tively) results in either an increased demand for other drugs in the same
molecule-form segment, as also suggested by the conditional elasticities in
MPH-IR segment, or possibly no effect since unconditional elasticity with
generic MPH-ER is not significant. Outside the segment, it leads to an
increased demand for Concerta and MAS drugs but not for any of the
4-hour MPH-IR medications where consumption would decrease due to
complementarity with them. On the other hand, a price increase in
Concerta results in an increased demand for all the 4-hour and 8-hour
medications in the MPH group as well as for drugs in the MAS group.
Also note that the increase in demand for any of the MAS drugs, com-
pared to an increase in the demand for MPH drugs, is relatively small for
a price increase in any of the three MPH drugs. These patterns suggest
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that children on an MPH-ER/MPH-IR combination therapy mostly stay
with the same mixed therapy after a price change due to the availability of
choice, but those on a single dose of the 12-hour Concerta may switch
over to a mixture of MPH-ER/MPH-IR, or even MAS, after a price
increase in Concerta. By comparison, a price increase in either generic
Adderall or Adderall XR (see columns 10 and 11) significantly increases
the demand for drugs in the MPH segment suggesting a switch in choice
of molecule, especially for a price increase in Adderall XR (as noted
earlier, the magnitude of cross-elasticity between generic Adderall and
Adderall is large and likely not significant only because these two drugs
were estimated with two years of data). The switch from Adderall XR to
MPH therapy could happen because a price increase in 12-hour Adderall
XR leaves little choice within the molecule if 12-hour coverage is impor-
tant, and hence patients either switch to the 12-hour MPH (Concerta) or
an 8-hour/4-hour combination available in MPH. Next, reading row-wise,
the results suggest that the demand for Metadate ER/CD, Methylin ER,
and Concerta (rows 5,6 and 8) is affected by price changes in MPH and
MAS drugs and the magnitudes are large. The result is particularly note-
worthy for Concerta where a price increase in any of the other MPH or
MAS drugs is associated with an increase in treatment via Concerta. By
comparison, demand for generic Adderall and Adderall XR (rows 9 and
11) also increases with a price increase in any of the MPH based drugs,
but the magnitude is much smaller compared to the ones in rows 5, 6,
and 8.
These results suggest the following: removing Metadate ER/CD or
Methylin ER from the choice set would result in children being switched to
other drugs within the class or Concerta, implying some welfare reduction
due to a switch to higher priced Concerta or to lower (perceived) quality of
generic MPH-ER. On the other hand, removing Concerta from the choice
set would result in possibly a larger welfare reduction since children are
switched from a once a day Concerta to a mixed therapy option of
MPH-ER and MPH-IR or switch to MAS therapy. Similarly, removing
Adderall XR or generic Adderall switches children to non-MAS therapies
which can lead to large welfare reductions. These effects are further com-
plicated when one considers that the removal of any one drug from the
choice set may also mean a change in the prices of the remaining drugs. For
instance, if firms set prices as Nash-Bertrand, then removal of Concerta
from the choice set (by exogenously setting its price high enough so that
demand is zero) would imply a higher price of all remaining drugs due to
the positive cross-elasticities in column 8. On the other hand, a higher price
of Metadate ER/CD does not necessarily imply a higher equilibrium price
of all remaining drugs since Metadate ER/CD is a complement to several
drugs (see column 5). The next section computes the relative magnitudes of
these effects.
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V(vi). Welfare Calculations
In this section, we report the estimated welfare changes associated with
each of the new drug introductions: Concerta, Adderall XR, MAS-IR (i.e.,
generic Adderall), Methylin ER and Metadate ER/CD. Following several
previous studies, e.g., Hausman [1997], Hausman and Leonard [2002,
2005], we compute the compensating variation associated with each new
product by calculating the ‘virtual price,’ i.e., an artificial price for the new
drug that would be just high enough to set the quantity demanded to zero.
The virtual price is then used to simulate consumer welfare associated with
the change in all prices from the pre- to post- introduction period. The
virtual price for each new drug is inferred as an out-of-sample projection
from the empirical demand parameter estimates. In particular, we use the
unconditional elasticity matrix to back out the parameters of the uncondi-
tional demand system and use these parameters to solve for the price that
would set the demand for the drug in question to zero. Let this be the
virtual price of the drug prior to its introduction. The virtual price minus
the observed price represents the hypothetical price difference in a ‘but-for’
world where the drug is first absent from the set of ADHD drug choices and
then introduced in the market.
The computation algorithm for the new prices in the ‘but-for’ world is
fairly standard and we only briefly describe it here. Using the unconditional
elasticities and a Nash-Bertand price competition model, we first back out
the marginal costs (ci) of each of the I products using the equation
(5) p c Q p p Zi i i I i= + −Ω 1 1( , , , ))…
where Ω Θli li Q p p Zp
i I i
l
= −
∂
∂
( , , , )1… and Θli is a 1/0 matrix with ones in the
leading diagonal and in locations when a firm jointly produces drugs l and
i (for a complete derivation see Nevo [1998]). Next, using the virtual price
of the drug of interest, the marginal costs estimated above, and the demand
parameters, we solve for the equilibrium price of the remaining I − 1
products in each market (two computational adjustments were necessary
and are described in Appendix A) This set of new prices can then be used
to compute the CV using all the old observed prices and the new vector of
prices.
Our welfare measure of compensating variations CV can be computed
from the expenditure functions derived from the estimated top-level equa-
tion. Let the price vector change from po to p′ such that the price index (at
the top level equation) changes from po to p′. Then
(6) CV h z u dzo
p
po
= ⋅
′
∫ ( , ( ))
where
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Prior to the calculations, there are two related issues in terms of interpret-
ing the welfare calculations that need to be addressed. First, do patients
have any sovereignty over the choice of a drug or do they only follow the
brand/generic choices prescribed by the physician, who may not be price
sensitive, and even if patients do, are they (or physicians as their agents)
sensitive to price differentials given that most are insured and only make a
co-payment? Insurance companies make extensive use of multi-tiered phar-
macy benefits in their formularies where drugs placed in tier one often have
a small co-payment by the consumer, those in tier two require substantially
greater co-payment while tier three drugs require the highest co-payment.
Recent evidence from the implementation of multi-tiering in different
health plans suggest that even insured patients are sensitive to price differ-
entials. Total expenditures, and more importantly, the utilization of medi-
cation, is found to be significantly lower for tier three drugs than for tier
one preferred drugs (Huskamp, Deverka, Epstein et al. [2005, 2003,]
Fairman, Motheral and Henderson [2003], Nair, Wolfe, Valuck et al.
[2003], Rector, Finch, Danzon, et al. [2003], Thomas, Wallack, Lee et al.
[2002], Motheral and Frirman [2001]). Thus, price differentials and/or dis-
counts from manufacturers to insurance companies dictate the insurance
companies’ decision to place a drug within a specific tier which in turn
appears to change the patient (or their doctor’s) behavior to switch to
cheaper drugs.
Second, given that both the patient and the insurance company make a
payment, how should one interpret the area under the demand curve? The
representative consumer metaphor used in this paper makes the decision
process a joint decision by both the patient and the insurance company.
The area under a representative consumer’s demand curve is the sum of the
consumer’s surplus plus the insurance company’s surplus and without
explicit data on co-payments by each sale, it cannot be separated into the
two components. Nonetheless, the sum of the two provides a useful way of
accessing and comparing the net value of new introductions to society.
Further, while savings from the consumption of a cheaper drug are initially
made by the insurance company, in the long run and with a fairly large
number of insurers, it can be argued that these would be passed onto the
consumer in the form of lower premiums as well as lower co-payments if
the patient chooses a drug in tier one. Thus, the CV computations given
below are best used to judge the value of new introductions—generics and
me-toos—to the society as a whole (insurer plus consumer) rather than how
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much of it is captured by different parties (for a similar interpretation of
welfare calculations see Branstetter, Chatterjee and Higgins [2011, p. 21]).
Using 2003 data, we calculate the CV separately for each MSA county in
the sample. The resulting distribution of estimates is reported in Table VII
under the heading ‘Full Elasticity Matrix.’ The results are expressed in
terms of total dollars in the locality, as a percentage of total ADHD
expenditures in the county and in terms of ‘per-ADHD-child.’ The per-
ADHD-child estimate is a crude approximation based upon the local non-
adult population and a conservative estimate (5%) of the incidence of
ADHD among children and adolescents. The welfare effects of each drug
span a wide range across cities, reflecting unique local conditions in the
consumption choices.
The results reveal that the largest welfare benefits were generated by
three drugs, Concerta, Adderall XR, and generic Adderall. The introduc-
tion of generic Adderall led to significant market expansion while the other
two were the first 12-hour drugs within their respective molecules. In total,
these three drugs accounted for 57.6% of the ADHD market in 2003.
Outside of drugs in the OTH group (mostly Strattera), none of the other
drugs in our sample have as much as a 5% share. The introduction of
Concerta produced the largest estimated welfare effect, followed by that of
TABLE VII
COMPENSATING VARIATION
Total CV Per County ($1000s)
Full Elasticity Matrix Reduced Elasticity Matrix
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Adderall XR −369.36 −178.50 583.80 −356.41 −172.80 564.62
Concerta −401.89 −200.84 584.32 −384.27 −193.32 556.55
MAS-IR* −201.14 −93.46 324.81 −133.64 −61.31 218.50
Metadate CD/ER −52.15 −25.56 79.32 −47.39 −22.95 71.72
Methylin ER −14.96 −6.63 25.99 −15.82 −6.86 26.27
CV as Percentage of Total Expenditure Per County
Adderall XR −14.41% −14.26% 3.66% −13.89% −13.80% 3.67%
Concerta −16.65% −16.53% 3.58% −15.99% −15.80% 3.57%
MAS-IR* −7.74% −7.60% 2.44% −5.08% −4.91% 2.05%
Metadate CD/ER −2.15% −1.99% 0.86% −1.96% −1.81% 0.81%
Methylin ER −0.62% −0.53% 0.41% −0.67% −0.58% 0.42%
CV per ADHD Child in County ($/per ADHD Child)
Adderall XR −123.38 −104.11 93.10 −119.23 −100.06 90.88
Concerta −137.04 −120.94 92.39 −131.41 −115.83 88.79
MAS-IR* −65.18 −54.82 49.27 −43.47 −34.97 36.01
Metadate CD/ER −17.32 −15.02 11.94 −15.78 −13.61 10.97
Methylin ER −4.67 −3.93 3.50 −5.04 −4.27 3.74
*MAS-IR is generic Adderall.
Note: The table displays the CV in a ‘but for’ world where the listed drug is not in the choice set (i.e., it is priced
at the virtual price) and all remaining N − 1 drugs are at a new NB price equilibrium. The second set (under
‘Reduced Elasticity Matrix’) is the CV calculations when all non-significant cross-elasticities are set to zero.
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Adderall XR and generic Adderall. On average, the welfare gain associated
with Concerta is $401K, or about $137 per ADHD child. The estimated
value has large variations across the country. This variation is partly due to
the population size, with the largest cities generating up to $5.89 million in
compensating variations overall. Expressed as dollars per ADHD child, the
range of values ($924 to $3) is over two hundred fold. This suggests that
there are considerable local area variations in the acceptance of these drugs.
In contrast, the effects of the other two drugs, Metadate ER/CD and
Methylin ER—introduced in segments where several branded and generics
already existed—are much smaller, i.e., consumers derive relatively less
benefit from the increased choices they provide.
Several cross elasticity estimates, particularly in the DEX segment, were
not significant. To check the sensitivity of welfare calculations to non-
significant cross price elasticities, we re-estimated the N-B equilibrium
prices and the CV computations by first setting non-significant off-diagonal
elasticity terms to zero. The results are given in the column ‘Reduced
Elasticity Matrix’ and show that while the point estimates are different, the
magnitude, variation and the relative ranking do not change.
V(vii). Robustness and Sensitivity
The reported estimates in the previous sections were generally robust to
several small changes in specifications or estimation procedures. Adding or
dropping exogenous variables such as (log of) number of MD’s, number of
children, Medicaid population or public drug expenditures by states did
not change the estimates in any substantial way. We also estimated models
with additional county level variables (demographic breakdowns by race,
per capita income, unemployment rates, etc.) with no significant changes in
the estimated elasticities. Changes in estimation procedures such as switch-
ing from full system estimations (3SLS or SUR) to partial system estima-
tions (i.e., 2SLS and OLS but with cross-equation and within-equation
restrictions imposed by the homogeneity and symmetry conditions) did not
affect the estimated parameters much. The results were also robust to how
the Stone price index was constructed within each segment. Within each
segment, we used year-specific area-averaged shares sit fm in the construc-
tion of the price index but switching to area-specific year-averaged shares
sia fm did not change the results.
One exception to the robustness was the ‘OTH’ drug estimates in the
level 3 equations shown in Table III. The share of ‘OTH’ increased dra-
matically in 2003 when Strattera—the only non-stimulant ADHD drug—
was introduced. The share of ‘OTH’ (the aggregate drug 17) increased from
10% in 2002, when it consisted of only pemoline and modafinil molecules to
25.6% in 2003 when it also includes the branded version of atomoxetine
(Strattera) without much change in the price of ‘other drug.’ Further, this
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large increase was almost entirely due to Strattera (Table II) which, on
average consisted of 61% of the ‘OTH’ drug and ranged from 19% to 99%
across counties. We experimented with accounting for the introduction of
a non-stimulant drug (which changes the nature of the ‘OTH’ drugs as all
others are stimulants), by removing Strattera from the ‘OTH’ group, drop-
ping 2003 data, adding a dummy variable for Strattera, adding the relative
share of Strattera within ‘OTH,’ and by entirely removing the ‘OTH’ group
from level 3 equations. Each of these changes only reconfirmed that the
‘OTH’ equation, and consequently the own and cross elasticities of drug
17 in the unconditional elasticity matrix, are not robust (the others were
fairly stable). Thus in our final estimate, we did not impose any homoge-
neity in the level 3 Cobb-Douglas equations, nor did we impose any sym-
metry restrictions between ‘OTH’ and the other three molecules and used
single equation methods to estimate this segment. Finally, since the cross-
effects of this last drug are large and in turn affect the welfare computa-
tions, in the welfare calculations we set the off-diagonal in the elasticity
matrix associated with this drug to zero. This was so that when the Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium prices are computed for the remaining 16 drugs in the
but-for world, the cross-effects with this drug do not impact those calcu-
lations. Thus, in the but-for world calculations given earlier, the price of
this other drug does not change nor does it interact with the remaining 16
drugs.
V(viii). Alternative Nesting
Our current nesting is based on the grouping of drugs given in Table I and
that the decision maker first chooses a molecule and then the form. Alter-
natively, if the decision maker first chooses the form (4-hour, 8-hour,
12-hour, or other) and then the molecule, followed by the choice of specific
drugs, it would still result in the same bottom level (level 1) grouping as well
as the same top level equation (tree diagram omitted). However, the level 2
share equations would consists of shares of molecules within forms (e.g., in
the 12-hour form, Adderall XR and Concerta would be the two drugs in
this segment) while level 3 would consist of Cobb-Douglas equations for
quantities by form rather than quantities by molecules. We estimated all
equations under this alternative tree structure as well. The middle two level
equations (level 2 and level 3) under the alternative tree structure are not
directly comparable to the original estimates but several results from this
alternative structure seemed implausible, both because of the implied sub-
stitution patterns and the resulting upward sloping demand curves for
several drugs. We interpret these alternative results as indicating that the
initially imposed structure—molecule followed by the form rather than the
other way round—is consistent with the observed data. While it is possible
that some physicians/consumers may first be choosing the form and then
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the molecule, perhaps the majority and hence the typical decision maker
chooses the molecule followed by the form.
V(ix). Limitations
We turn now to note potential limitations of this study and its results. First,
our data on drug sales at the pharmacy level omit unreported payments in
the form of rebates directly to the payer, e.g., the Medicaid Rebate
Program. The net effect of these adjustments on payment flows to phar-
macies, i.e., the proportion omitted from our data, is difficult to trace due
to diverse methodologies used by states for reimbursing pharmacies.
Second, with the data available for this study, we were not able to measure
the effect of one important new drug, Strattera. It entered in the final year
of our panel and we had to aggregate it into a collective set of other drugs.
Third, pharmaceutical products in general, and certainly ADHD drugs
in particular, are experience goods and we should expect high marketing-
to-sales ratios for these drugs (Nelson [1974]). Indeed total promotion to
manufacturer sales were at 14% in 2000 (Frank, Berndt, Donohue et al.
[2002]). If the marketing-to-sales ratios of drugs analyzed here are fairly
similar (at least for some of the block buster drugs) then given that we
estimate large elasticities for Concerta, Adderall XR, etc., the Dorfman-
Steiner theorem would imply that the advertising elasticities are also fairly
large. Nonetheless, we do not have promotional activity data by specific
drugs and markets and hence cannot estimate advertising elasticities nor
can we provide any insight into how promotional activities affect substitu-
tion possibilities within or across the molecules and forms. While it would
be interesting to know how changes in direct-to-consumer marketing and
physician detailing affected market shares in the ADHD market, that
question is beyond the scope of this study.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The models and methods employed here with the aid of richly detailed data
are effective tools for evaluating drug demand systems in pharmaceutical
markets like ADHD drugs, where large sets of differentiated products
experience episodes of new drug introduction. Our demand analysis shows
that the demand for ADHD drugs is elastic and there are significant sub-
stitution possibilities among these drugs, both within the molecule and
form as well as across segments. Further, it sheds light on why some drugs
were more successful than others. Both Concerta and Adderall XR created
new niche markets within their respective molecules by introducing new
delivery mechanisms. Consumers placed a large value on these introduc-
tions, on average approximately $137 and $123 per child per year respec-
tively, and consequently these two drugs achieved 24% and 26% of the
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ADHD drug market. The introduction of generic Adderall in the MAS-IR
segment extended the market and was also very valuable to consumers
(about $65 per child per year). Further, these three drugs are substitutes for
other drugs and consequently their introduction led to lower equilibrium
prices of other drugs. However, the two other introductions, Methylin ER
and Metadate CD, did not create new niche markets (albeit Metadate CD
was the first to provide a combination of rapid-release and slow-release
beads via a capsule in the MPH-ER segment) since both were introduced in
a segment where branded as well as generic drugs already existed. Further,
being complements to drugs in the MPH-IR segment, their introduction is
associated with a higher equilibrium price for drugs in the MPH-IR
segment. Consequently, consumers placed a lower value on these introduc-
tions, as measured by the welfare calculations, which may explain the low
market shares of these two drugs (.6% and 2.6% respectively).
Our results speak directly to the policy proposals aimed at slowing the
introduction of me-too drugs (Angell [2004], Goozner [2004]). Angell
[2004] calls upon the FDA to change its approval standards and require
me-too drugs to demonstrate not only efficacy relative to placebos, but
clinical superiority compared to existing drugs, while Hollis [2004] offers a
similar but more tempered version of the proposal.9 On the other hand,
DiMasi and Paquette [2004] argue that me-too’s provide therapeutic
options previously not available, and that me-too’s are often engaged in
development concurrently with the pioneering drug. Thus, changes in the
FDA approval policy would create moving targets in the clinical trial phase
since the developers would have to account for the possibility of being
second to reach the market and create tests to show superiority over the
winning first developer. Note that all four introductions that we focus on
are me-too drugs: none were the first drug in the therapeutic class, each filed
an application with the FDA for a new formulation (rather than a new
chemical entity) and each received a standard review rating from the FDA
(rather than a priority review). Yet two drugs (Adderall XR and Concerta)
generated welfare gains which were larger than those of the generic
introduction of MAS-IR while the other two (Metadate CD and Methylin
ER) resulted in gains that were about an order of magnitude smaller. As
our results suggest, not all me-too’s are created equal and over-arching
proposals aimed at slowing the introduction of all me-too’s may not be
appropriate.
9 Proponents offer several arguments such as: (a) me-too’s are similar to the pioneering
drugs and the incremental benefits and benefit/risk ratios are low; (b) me-too’s split the
market as opposed to expanding it, shorten the exclusivity period for the pioneering drugs,
and reduce the incentives to undertake R&D and, (c) pharmaceutical companies expend
significant resources on marketing their me-too drugs rather than on R&D itself (Hollis
[2004]).
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Our results also provide a rough estimate of a potential welfare loss due
to entry that did not take place. Shire holds two key patents on Adderall
XR that technically prevent entry in the MAS-ER segment until 2018 and
an exclusivity period until April, 2005, under the Hatch-Waxman Act.10
However, Barr Laboratories filed for an ANDA application with the FDA
in February, 2003, to market a generic version of Adderall XR (Barr
Laboratories, Inc. [2003c]). This was followed by a second ANDA appli-
cation filed by IMPAX in November, 2003, (Impax Laboratories, Inc.
[2003]). In response, Shire sued Barr as well as IMPAX for infringement of
its key patents (Barr Laboratories, Inc., [2003b, a]).11 The case between
Barr and Shire was scheduled to go to trial in January, 2006, and would
have granted Barr 180 days of generic exclusivity under section IV of the
Hatch-Waxman Act if it won the case while IMPAX, as a second filer of an
ANDA, would not have gained an exclusivity period. However, in the same
month (January, 2006), Shire settled with IMPAX, the second filer of
ANDA, to market Adderall XR under a license from Shire no later than
January, 2010 (FDAnews Drug Daily Bulletin [2006]). This deal was fol-
lowed by a second out of court settlement (August, 2006), this time between
Shire and Barr, the original filer of ANDA, where Shire agreed to grant
Barr Laboratories a 180-day exclusive license to market generic Adderall
XR in exchange for delaying entry until April, 2009 (Barr Laboratories.
[2006], Patel, [2006]).12
The out of court settlements between Shire, Barr and IMPAX bear
features noted in several recent cases where, in exchange for delayed entry,
the agreement includes a ‘reverse payment’ from the patent holder to the
generic maker but allows for generic entry prior to patent expiration (see
Bulow [2004], Hemphill [2007], Frank [2007]).13 Like some of the earlier
similar cases where the FTC contested the settlements, the FTC initiated an
10 There was originally only one patent listed in the Orange Book and the original exclu-
sivity period was until October, 2004, but a six month extension was later granted for
Adolescent Pediatric Patients.
11 Barr Laboratories maintained that the patents listed by Shire are invalid, unenforceable
and/or will not be infringed by Barr Laboratories.
12 On April 2, 2009, Teva Pharmaceuticals (which now owns Barr) commenced shipping
generic Adderall XR in the U.S and IMPAX started shipping a generic version of Adderall
XR on October 2, 2009 (Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd [2009], Impax Laboratories, Inc.
[2009]).
13 Shire noted in its press release that no payments had been made to Barr in settlement of
the Adderall XR dispute. Nonetheless, the ‘reverse payments’ existed as a result of complex
side deals. The deal involved a payment from Shire to Duramed, a subsidiary of Barr in the
amount of $165 million described as compensation for product development related to
transvaginal ring technology for urinary incontinence, which Shire planned to apply to five
women’s health products, and an oral contraceptive called Seasonique. In addition, Shire
sold the rights to its older Adderall immediate release (IR) product to Duramed for $63
million, resulting in a net payment of $102 million by Shire (see Barr Laboratories,
Inc.[2006]).
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initial inquiry in October, 2006, and in June, 2007, Shire received a civil
investigative demand from FTC relating to its settlement with Barr and its
earlier settlement with IMPAX. These settlements also highlight loopholes
in the Hatch-Waxman Act [FTC, 2011]. For instance, while the Act pro-
vides a 180-day exclusivity period to the first filer of ANDA (to give
incentives for generic entry), it does not prevent the original patent holder
from licensing its drug to another generic maker which in effect nullifies the
180-day exclusivity of the first generic entrant. Note that the drug that did
not enter (Barr’s generic Adderall XR) shares attributes with two other
drugs for which welfare effects have been estimated: it is like the generic
MAS-IR (welfare effect $65-$43 per child per year) since it is a generic in
the same molecule class, and it is also like the branded Adderall XR
(welfare effect $123-$119 per child per year) since it is a 12-hour drug in the
same molecule class. While it is difficult to predict the outcomes of the court
proceedings and when first generic entry would have taken place in the
absence of any out of court settlements between these firms, nonetheless,
our estimates suggest that even a year earlier entry in generic MAS-ER
segment (Barr’s generic Adderall XR) could have been at least equal to the
lower of the two welfare effects estimated above.
APPENDIX A
ESTIMATION DETAILS
Dosage Equivalence
When a patient switches from one drug to another drug, the conversion is not always
gram for gram. Thus, in the demand estimation, we converted the prices from dollars
per gram to dollars per defined monthly dosage (DMD) using the dosage equivalence
given in Table I and World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition for defined daily
dosage (DDD). For the four hour MPH (i.e., Ritalin), WHO defines 30mg as DDD
or 0.9 grams per month. Thus, if the price per gram of Ritalin is pr, then the price per
month is 30 × 30 × pr/1000 = 0.9 × pr. For other drugs (not all are listed in the WHO
database), we first apply a dosage equivalence and then multiply by 0.9. For example,
the price of Concerta per gram in 2003 is $73.94, but 1mg of Concerta is equivalent
to 0.69mg of Ritalin and hence the price per month of Concerta is $73.94 ×
0.9/0.69 = $96.45. Thus, we are assuming that a typical patient consumes 0.9 grams of
Ritalin per month and if they are on another drug, appropriate dosage conversion is
used for grams per month. The robustness section reports differences in estimates
without these conversions. The table below is similar to the one in the main text
(Table II) except that it provides prices in dollars per Ritalin equivalent grams per
month.
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Fixed Shares
To avoid the obvious endogeneity problem that is introduced in share equations (1a,
1b) due to the use of the Stone-index (since then the share appears on both the left and
right hand side of the estimated equation, see equation 2), we follow Hausman and
Leonard [2002] and construct an alternative Stone-index using si fm which is the
average share of the drug i, f, m over all areas at time period t. This alternative
Stone-index is only used during estimation of the segment equations. Hausman and
Leonard [2002] in fact constructed the alternative Stone index from area-specific
shares averaged over the full sample period. However, the imbalance in the number of
years drugs are present in our data, and the fact that our panel is quite short to begin
with, argues against the construction of area specific time-averaged share measures
for the Stone indexes. Thus we use year specific area-averaged share measures across
all counties in the data. Specifically, we use sit fm. Further, our results are not sensitive
to this choice.
Segment by Segment estimation
Note that there are five sets of bottom level share equations, one for each of the
segments (1) MPH-IR (with three share equations), (2) MPH-ER (with four share
equations), (3) MAS-IR (with two share equations), (4) DEX-IR (with three share
equations) and, (4) DEX-ER (with two share equations). At level 2, three mid-level
segments need to be estimated. These are (1) MPH, where the shares are of IR, ER
and OROS (i.e., Concerta), (2) MAS, where the shares are of IR and ER (i.e.,
Adderall XR) and (3) DEX, where the shares are of ER and IR. At the next level up,
there are four quantity equations and at the top level there is only one equation.
The segment estimations are carried out separately and independently rather than
in a full joint system estimation because not all drugs are available in the market
throughout the study period. For instance, the bottom level segments, MPH-IR and
MPH-ER are observed for years 2000 to 2003 and hence these segments can be
estimated on a panel of 4 years of data. However the drugs in the bottom level
segment MAS-IR are observed for only two years (see Table II). While using a full
joint estimation across all segments provides a potential gain in efficiency—by using
cross-equation correlations across segments—it requires finding a common set of
years where all drugs are present. But this results in a substantial loss of data since
now all segments can only by estimated for two years of data rather than some that
can be estimated using four years of data. Note however that within each segment,
equations are still estimated jointly as a system. In the latter part of the paper we
compute and provide estimates of unconditional elasticities which require values of
parameters from different segments. Since each segment is estimated (as a system)
separately, covariances among parameters in different segments are not available.
Hence, use of delta methods to construct standard errors of unconditional elasticities
are invalid and hence we used bootstrap methods to construct confidence intervals.
Welfare computation
Two adjustments were made in the computations of NB equilibrium prices. First, the
computed marginal cost of Methylin was negative (due to inelastic estimated
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demand). Consequently, we set it’s elasticity equal to that of the generic in the
segment (which is almost equivalent to setting its marginal cost equal to that of the
generic). Note, if we left the marginal cost of Methylin at its original negative value,
the overall welfare effects were quite similar. Second, as noted in the paper, the
demand equation for drug 17 (an aggregate of four different drugs), was sensitive to
small changes in the model specification. The point estimates of the cross price
elasticities of this drug with respect to the remaining 16 would change with small
changes in the model. In turn, the estimates of the NB equilibrium prices (in the
but-for world) and the corresponding CV calculations would also change. To over-
come this difficulty, we set the off-diagonal in the elasticity matrix associated
with drug 17 to zero. This was so that when the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium prices
are computed for the remaining 16 drugs in the but-for world, the cross-effects
with drug 17 would not impact those calculations. Thus, in the but-for world calcu-
lations, the price of drug 17 does not change nor does it interact with the remaining
16 drugs.
Supplemental Materials
The Journal’s web site provides supplemental materials referenced in the article.
These include (a) restriction tests (homotheticity, homogeneity and symmetry), and
(b) IV regression coefficients for all segments.
Derivation of Elasticities
This section derives the conditional and unconditional elasticities (a more condensed
version for a two-level system is given in Ellison, Cockburn, Griliches et al. [1997]).
Observe that si
P Q
Rfm
i fm i fm
fm
≡ and hence lnQ lns lnP lnRi i i ffm fm fm m= − + . Thus, elasticity
of ith drug in f-m segment with resect to kth drug in f′ − m′ segment is given by
(A-1)
∂
∂
=
∂
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k i f f m m1[ , , ]
where 1[.] is an indicator function equal to 1 when the statement inside is true and is
otherwise 0. Note that the subscripts are such that if m ≠ m′ then it automatically
implies that f ≠ f′ and i ≠ k. Similarly, if f ≠ f′ then i ≠ k.
Elasticities Conditional on Segment Revenue
We first compute elasticities conditional on the revenue segment Rfm . Then in equa-
tion (A-1) we can set the partial of Rfm equal to zero. From equation (1a) we have
∂
∂
= −
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where once again, in equation (1a) we have set the partial of Rfm equal to zero. Next,
from equation (2a), the partial of the fixed-weight Stone index of segment f-m with
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respect to lnPk fm′ ′ is zero if m′ ≠ m and f′ ≠ f but otherwise is sk fm . Hence the elasticity
(conditional on Rfm ) is
(A-2)
∂
∂
= − + ′ = ′ =
′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′
lnQ
lnP s
s f f m m
i
k i
i k ij
fm
fm fm
fm fm fm
1
1{( ). [ , ]}β γ − = ′ = ′ =1[ , , ]i k f f m m
Thus, elasticities conditional on Rfm are zero across drugs in different f-m segments.
Incidently, observe that by the same logic, elasticities of forms within a molecule with
respect to the price index for the form, conditional on Rm, has a similar formula and
is given by
(A-3)
∂
∂
= − + ′ = − ′ = ′ =
′
′
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lnQ
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b u g m m f f m mf
f f
f f fh
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m m m
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Unconditional Elasticities
Share of drug i in segment f-m is affected by the price of drug k in some other segment
f′-m′ only via the change in the expenditures of the segments. Specifically, when the
price of drug k in segment f′-m′ changes, it changes the price index of segment f′-m′.
When the price index of segment f′-m′ changes, it changes the relative prices of
segments f′-m′ and f-m. This in turn changes the share of revenue spent on segment
f-m vs. f′-m′ and is determined by the middle level share equations. Thus when
computing the relevant partials we do not hold Rfm (or Rm) constant. Further, the
link between the bottom and middle level equations is established by considering the
ratio R Pf fm m in equation (1a) as a measure of a standard unit of quantity of
molecule m and form f, i.e. R P Qf f fm m m= and since u f
P Q
Rm
fm fm
m
≡ , we substitute
u R Pf m fm m for R Pf fm m in the bottom level share equation (1a). Similarly, in the
middle level share equation (1b), we substitute Qm from the top level quantity equa-
tion (1c).
The general expression for elasticities is given in equation (A-1). We evaluate each
of the partials above while making the appropriate substitutions. First, observe that
by substituting Qfm for R Pf fm m in the bottom level share equation (1a) we get
s ln Q lnPi i i f j
I
ij jfm fm fm m
fm
fm fm
= + + ∑
=
α β γ( ) 1 and hence
∂
∂
=
∂
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Similarly, since lnR lnP lnQf f fm m m= + hence
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∂
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Substituting these two partials in the general elasticity equation (A-1) above we get,
(A-4)
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Thus, we need to evaluate ∂∂
′ ′
lnQ
ln P
fm
k fm
and substitute it in the equation above. Note that
lnQ ln u lnR lnPf f m fm m m= + −( ) and hence
(A-5)
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To evaluate the two partials in (A-5) above, we substitute Qm for Rm/Pm in the middle
level share equation (1b), i.e., u a b ln Q g lnPf f f m h
F
fh hm m m
m
m m= + + ∑ =( ) 1 and use the
chain rule. Thus,
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Hence equation (A-5) becomes
(A-7)
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1
We can substitute equation (A-7) back into (A-4) to get elasticities in terms of these
new partials as
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(A-8)
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which further simplifies to
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Note that the remaining partials are with respect to the (log of) price indexes Pfm′ ′ as
opposed to with respect to the (log of) actual prices and are easily evaluated from
the middle and top level equations. Thus from the middle level equation
u a b ln Q g lnPf f f m h
F
fh hm m m
m
m m= + + ∑ =( ) 1 (with Qm substituted in for Rm/Pm) we get,
(A-9)
∂
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=
∂
∂
+ = ′
′ ′
′
′ ′
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u
lnP
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lnQ
lnP
g m mf
f
f
m
f
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m . [ ].1
Next, since lnP u lnPm h
F
h h
m
m m= ∑ =1 therefore ∂ ∂ =′ ′lnP lnP um f fm m but
∂ ∂ =′ ′lnP lnPm fm 0 and hence
(A-10)
∂
∂
= ′ =
′
′
′
′
lnP
lnP
u m mm
f
f
m
m . [ ].1
Finally, from the top level quantity equation ln Q A B ln Rm m m( ) ( )= + +
lnPn
M
mn n∑ =1Γ we get
(A-11)
∂
∂
=
′
′ ′
′
′
lnQ
lnP
um
f
mm f
m
mΓ
where note that in this last partial derivative there is no indicator function since the
top level equation itself consists of all molecule level price indexes.
Thus, we can substitute equations (A-9, A-10 and A-11) into (A-8) to get the final
expression for elasticities in terms of the shares and model parameters. Upon substi-
tution this gives the unconditional elasticities as
(A-12)
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APPENDIX B
This appendix provides three sets of results mentioned in the paper: (a) restriction
tests, (b) full unconditional elasticity matrices (SUR and 3SLS) and, (c) regression
coefficients.
Restriction Tests
TABLE BI
HOMOGENEITY AND SYMMETRY RESTRICTIONS TESTS
ChiSq DF p-value
MPH-IR 17.01 3 0.0007
MPH-ER 10.63 6 0.1005
MPH 8.364 3 0.0391
MAS-IR 3.080 1 0.0792
MAS 21.92 1 0.0000
DEX-IR 0.411 3 0.9379
DEX-ER 0.224 1 0.6359
DEX 0.187 1 0.6653
Molecules 20.62 10 0.0239
Molecules (MPH, MAS, DEX Symmetry only) 1.258 3 0.7391
Note: The chi-square test statistic is the Wald statistic computed as W h A VA hT T= −( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆθ θ θ θ where h( )θˆ
is the column vector of restrictions, A h( )ˆ ˆθ θ θ=
∂
∂ , θˆ are the unrestricted estimated coefficients and Vˆ is the
variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted coefficients. The DF column provides the number of restric-
tions being jointly tested. Thus, for instance, in the MPH-IR segment, since there are three share equations,
2 homogeneity and one symmetry restriction is tested (the parameters of the last equation are not tested since
conservation, i.e., shares, add-up to one, is still imposed in these tests). The last test is when only symmetry is
imposed between MPH, MAS and DEX.
TABLE BII
HOMOTHETICITY TESTS
ChiSq DF p-value
MPH-IR 21.45 2 0.0000
MPH-ER 268.5 3 0.0000
MPH 150.4 2 0.0000
MAS-IR 10.29 1 0.0013
MAS 63.53 1 0.0000
DEX-IR 15.01 2 0.0005
DEX-ER 0.202 1 0.6534
DEX 55.69 1 0.0000
Molecules 24.46 4 0.0001
Note: The chi-square test statistic is the usual Wald statistic. The tests given above are joint tests for
homothecity within a segment, i.e., the coefficients on ln(R/P) are each different from zero. However, in the
share equations, homogeneity and symmetry are already imposed. Also, since the shares must add to one, the
last share equation within each segment is never estimated. Thus, in a segment with 3 share equations, the joint
test is that β1 = 0 and β2 = 0 (but β3 = 0 cannot be tested). Similarly, in segments where there are just two share
equations, the joint test is just a single test, i.e., β1 = 0 and in these cases, the chi-sq statistic is just the square
of the z-statistic on the regression coefficient. In the molecules segment (m3) homogeneity is not imposed (also
since these are not shares equations, conservation is also not imposed) and symmetry is imposed within the
MPH, MAS and DEX molecules.
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Regression Coefficients
The following applies to all regression results reported below. (1) Each segment is
estimated separately as a system (3SLS). The last equation in each segment is not
estimated but is implied by system restrictions (i.e., homogeneity, symmetry and
conservation were imposed). (2) All regressions include state dummies but are not
displayed. (3) The table shows the mean and standard deviations of the bootstrap
regression coefficients. (4) The numbers 1, 2, . . . on log prices refer to the price of
drugs 1, 2, . . . in the segment (i.e., are re-set to 1 within each segment). Similarly,
ln(R/P ) refers to the coefficient on log of ratio of expenditure to price index for the
segment. The exception is the molecule level segment (level 3 Cobb-Douglas equa-
tions) where homogeneity is not imposed and symmetry restrictions are imposed only
between MPH, MAS and DEX.
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